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1. Is Quantum Mechanics connected with philosophical issues about dispositions? 
 
Given the controversial status of the various interpretations of non-relativistic quantum 
mechanics (QM for short), it may seem crazy to use the philosophy of quantum physics to try 
to learn some lessons about the prevailing problems in the literature on dispositions and 
causal powers. However, such an attempt seems worthwhile for at least three reasons.  
The first is more internal to the philosophy of QM. Apart from a seminal paper by 
Robert Clifton and Constantine Pagonis (1995), who investigated the issue of dispositional 
properties in Bohmian mechanics, to my knowledge no one has tried to shed some light on 
the role played by dispositions in the various interpretations of QM. This seems particularly 
surprising if one considers that some of the founding fathers of quantum physics, notably 
Werner Heisenberg, have made direct reference to A istotelian potentiae to refer to and 
interpret the mysterious nature of the atomic and subatomic world “in se”, or before 
measurement: «Such a probability function [i.e. the statistical algorithm of quantum theory] 
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combines objective and subjective elements. It contains statements on possibilities, or better 
tendencies (“potentiae in Aristotelian philosophy), and such statement are completely 
objective, they don’t depend on any observer…the passage from the “possible” to the real 
takes place during the act of observation» (Heisenberg 1958, p. 67-69) 
Some years before, Henry Margenau had already chacterized the properties of 
quantum systems as merely lat nt, in contrast to the properties intervening in the description 
of classical systems, which are always definite even when they are merely dispositional 
(1954, p. 6). Similarly Karl Popper (1982) and Nicholas Maxwell (1988) have defended some 
sort of a propensity interpretation of probability, and a view of quantum reality essentially 
characterized by irreducibly probabilistic propensities. Influenced by this tradition, Michael 
Redhead’s influential extbook on the philosophy of QM distinguishes among three different 
interpretations of the theory, the second of which presupposes real propensities and 
potentialities and attributes to measurements the function of «converting latent values in 
possessed values» (1987, p. 48).2 Clearly, for this second interpretation to make less than an 
instrumentalistic sense, one needs to construe potentialities and dispositions as real propertie
of systems. 
Consequently, it seems important to try to get a firmer grasp of the sen e in which some 
interpretations of QM need irreducible dispositions to shed light on the nature of the 
properties of quantum systems before measurements, in particular when the state of such 
systems is not an eigenstate of the relevant physical observable.  
 The second reason to look into the relationships between the philosophy of QM and the 
literature on dispositions comes from a methodological prescription that I regard as very 
important for the well-b ing and the prosperity of analytic philosophy in general: rigorous 
conceptual, a priori analysis, typical of this philosophical tradition, should always be 
accompanied by massive injections of a posteriori knowledge coming from the empirical 
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sciences. Consider as an example the discussions on the reality of becoming stemming from 
McTaggart’s celebrated paper on the reality of time (1908). If we were to conclude that 
becoming as explicated by some metaphysical theories of time is incompatible with well-
confirmed physical theories (in particular, w th the special and general theories of relativity), 
we should make appropriate adjustments in the metaphysical theories and not try to change 
the physical theories to eliminate the conflict with our metaphysical prejudices!3  
Analogously, if, say, Armstrong’s thesis of the reducibility of dispositional to 
categorical properties (Armstrong 1996) were to prove incompatible with the most reasonable 
understanding of QM, I take it that the defenders of such a reductionist thesis should consider 
the conflict of their metaphysical hypothesis with a fundamental physical theory at least as 
worrisome. In a word, to the extent that one is not an instrumentalist about scientific theories 
in general, the incompatibility of a metaphysical view with a well- stablished physical theory 
is an excellent starting point for a philosophical analysis.  
As a third reason to venture into our project, consider that establishing some conceptual 
links between the foundations of QM and the debate on the nature of dispositions may have 
interesting consequences for both QM and such a debate. For instance, it may be interesting 
to ask whether minimally realist readings of QM naturally pair with realism about 
dispositions or causal powers, or whether the two forms of “realism” are independent of each 
other.  
After having given some motivations for the paper, I can state its main thesis: 
independently of the preferred interpretation of quantum mechanics, dispositio al properties 
are extremely important to make sense of what we find in experimental practice in QM. Both 
in Bohm’s and Bohr’s interpretations for instance, despite their remarkable differences, the 
nature of quantum reality – whose mind-independence Bohr never denied – is highly 
“relational”. This essentially means that what an quantum entity is, namely the properties it 
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has, relationally depends not just on what other entities it has interacted with in the past (non-
locality), but also on the whole experimental arrangement with which it interacts (quantum 
holism). In a word, the experimental context provides the context of manifestation of quantum 
mechanical properties that must be conceived as essentially dispositional. If two 
interpretations of QM that are so metaphysically and methodologically different as Bohr’s 
and Bohm’s are, end up sharing such an important core, the dispositional nature of the 
quantum world seems a feature of the world that is here to stay.  
A final word of reassurance for the non-specialist metaphysician: since the paper 
should be read as an invitation to look at the wonders of quantum physics, in matters 
quantum mechanical it is as self-contained and devoid of technical terms as possible. 
 
2. Should we distinguish between dispositional nd categorical properties?  
 
 One of the main metaphysical problems in the lit rature on dispositions and categorical 
(or occurrent) properties is the nature of their relationship. Can we consider physical, 
dispositional properties like fragility or conductivity as being identical to (micro-structural) 
categorical properties – as Armstrong (1996) and Mumford (1998) have it–– or should we 
rather say that the latter causesor realizes the former in such a way that dispositional and 
categorical properties are to be regarded as different – as Place (1996) has it? And 
furthermore, within monistic philosophies of dispositions, in which the difference between 
categorical and dispositional properties merely depends on the way we pick them up with our 
predicates, should we claim that dispositions don’t exist because all properties are categorical 
(what Mumford calls “Categorical Monism”, (1998, p. 19) or should rather adopt 
“Dispositional Monism”, according to which all properties are dispositional?  
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In order to try to answer these questions by bringing to bear the philosophy of QM, we 
need a clear account of the “contrast class” of dispositions: what is the difference between a 
dispositional and a non-dispositional property? If we can find no difference, we can conclude 
for monism even before trying, and in any case the questions above will turn out to be not 
well posed.  
Let us start from a simple analysis of ordinary language, by considering unquestionably 
clear examples of dispositional terms, like “irritable” or “poisonous”. As is well known, the 
properties in question are dispositional because they tend to manifest themselves and become 
actual or “occurrent” only in appropriate contexts. It seems to me that one way to make 
progress in understanding the questions above is to recall that the function of dispositions in 
our language is to encode useful information about the way objects around us will behaveif
subject to causal interactions with other entities (mainly ourselves). If true, this remark shows 
that the function of dispositional predicates in ordinary language is essentially predictive. 
Consider the evolutionary advantage of classing all animals or people around our ancestors as 
“dangerous” or “innocuous”, as “peaceful” or “ferocious”. In learning that a particular 
mushroom is “poisonous”, a child learning the language also learns to stay away from it 
whenever she recognizes one. 
I think that the predictive role of dispositional terms is the main explanation of the 
reason why our languages are so rich with dispositional terms, and also points, more or less 
directly, to the complex relationships linking dispositions with causes, with counterfactuals 
and, eventually, with laws of nature as they are expressed in our scientific languages. 
Dispositions express directly or indirectly those regularities of the world around us that 
enable us to predict the future: “if I were to eat this mushroom, I would die” is a piece of 
information that seems to be entailed by the predictive content of “poisonous”. Such an 
information, importantly, refers not just to the nature of the mushroom “in itself”, but to the 
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“meaning” it has for us: its “poisonous-ness” matters for us, of course, and refers to the 
power a particular typeof mushroom has when entering in causal contact with a human body. 
Notice that by stressing the relational role that dispositions have in rdinary language, I 
am not thereby endorsing an analysis of dispositional predicates in terms of conditionals, 
material or counterfactual as they may be. Rather, I am merely claiming that the function of 
dispositional terms in our “background” experiential knowledge of the world is essentially 
predictive, independently of whether such terms refer to properties to be regarded as 
irreducibly real or are just a shorthand to refer to a micro-s ructural, categorical basis together 
with a context of manifestation. 
The “survival value” of dispositional properties – possibly referring to the “meaning” 
that the objects around them had for hunters-gatherers trying to find their way around in a 
threatening world – also points to another, related feature of dispositional properties, first 
stressed by the founders of modern mechanical philosophy, and before them by the ancient 
atomists. This feature corresponds to the fact that dispositional terms, besides expressing 
predictions, also refer to the way the world “in itself” appears to us. “Hard” and “soft”, 
“cold” and “warm”, “odorous” and “stinking”, “sweet” and “sour”, “red” and “white”, for 
philosophers like Galileo, Boyle, Descartes and Locke, do not point to properties existing in 
themselves (independently of mind), but to the products of the interaction of the “primary 
qualities” of objects with our senses.  
In this second sense, the meaning of dispositional predicates does not just lie in their 
predictive value, but in their mediating role between the mathematizable, quantitative world 
inhabited by primary qualities and what Husserl later called the Lebenswelt, he bountiful 
“world of life”. The second role of dispositions in the philosophical language seems to call 
attention to the fact that human beings filter and respond selectively to the mind-independent 
properties of the external world, either through their nervous system or their minds. “Being 
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hard”, “impenetrable”, “red”, “hot” implies a hidden conditional: if the object endowed with 
certain hidden or well known-powers (in Locke’s words) were perceived by a human being, 
then it would appear red, hard, soft, etc. 
Notice furthermore that in both of their functions, the ordinary and the more 
philosophical one, dispositional properties seem to be rela i nal properties or causal 
interactions of some sort: the property of “being soluble” needs an interaction with some 
liquid to manifest itself, in the same sense in which the odorousness of a flower needs the 
interaction of certain chemicals with human nostrils for its manifestation. Given the relational 
nature of dispositional predicates, shouldn’t we i entify the non-dispositional properties 
(categorical properties) with the merely intrinsic properties of an object, namely with those 
properties whose attribution to an entity does not presuppose any other entity?  
The shape, the height, the length or the volume of a body would seem to fit this 
requirement, at least to the extent that we are ready to claim that (i) such geometric features 
are mind-independent properties of objects and that (ii) length, height and volume can be 
characterized independently of the units of measures with respect to which they would 
become relational.  
However, if we identify the distinction between the dispositional and non-dispositional 
with the distinction between relational and intrinsic properties, most properties would come 
out as relational or extrinsic, so that the former distinction might seem to collapse with the 
latter. It could be argued that when carefully examined, many properties that seem to be 
intrinsic turn out to be relational (extrinsic): are there any interesting intrinsic physical 
properties that are not geometrical?  
Spin, charge and mass may superficially appear to be intrinsic properties, but it is 
controversial whether they are really so classifiable.4 On the one hand, to the extent that by 
“mass” we refer to the gravitational mass, we imply that there must be a certain context for 
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the property to manifest itself, namely the presence of a gravitational field: on th s account 
“having gravitational mass” would count as dispositional. Likewise, since inertial mass 
measures the resistance of a body to accelerations, also its manifestation seems to presuppose 
the presence of something else, namely a force. Even “being charged”, referred to a particle, 
may be regarded as the disposition to behave in a certain way in test-situations, something 
that seems to indicate that all physical concepts – linked as they are to possible operations we 
must perform for detecting them – ar  dispositional. 
On the other hand, this claim seems to be refuted by a distinction between the ontology 
and the pistemology of properties. Granting that the properties of entities are pis emically 
identified by the causal powers they have, if we separat the “operational side” of having 
spin, mass and charge – a side referring to certain experimental contexts as the empirical 
conditions for testing the presence of the property – from the physical fact that some system 
possess them independently of any manifestation, it would seem that “being massive” 
(regarded as possessing a certain quantity of matter), or “being charged”, regarded as the 
possession of properties that have certain causal powers, and “having spin”, can be 
legitimately considered to be intrins c properties of physical systems, namely properties 
whose attribution does not presuppose the existence of any other entity.  
A couple of remarks are appropriate at this point. First, relationality is not sufficient for 
dispositionality, as the example of the relational property “being married to” clearly shows. It 
follows that being relational is only necessary for being dispositional and that, by 
contraposition, being an intrinsic property can be a merely sufficient condition for being non-
dispositonal. In a word, we cannot identify or analyze the term “dispositional” with 
“relational”, and “categorical” with “intrinsic”.  
Second, despite this limitation, the fact that the criterion to separate intrinsic from 
relational properties yields some clear instances suggests that also the distinction between 
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dispositional and categorical is onceptually sound.5 Nevertheless, the possibility that we 
might refer to the same entity under two different descriptions, does not rule out the fact that 
the distinction between intrinsic and relational might be purely epistemic or conceptual, and, 
as such, devoid of any ontological import. H w can we exclude that, according to our 
different purposes, we might in some cases consider an intrinsic attribute of an entity (call it 
A) independently of any other entity and conclude for its categoricity, and in other cases 
consider its effects on other entity, while still referring to the very same A? It seems that the 
vagueness of our intuitions does not help us to settle the issue of the reducibility of 
dispositional concepts to categorical ones. 
 
3 Dispositions in QM 
 
In order to try to overcome this ontologically unclear situation, I propose to bring to 
bear the philosophy of QM, and to connect the debate we have so far illustrated with real-life 
physics. Within QM, it seems natural to replace “dispositional properties” with “non-definite 
properties”, i.e. properties that before measurement are objectively and actually “fuzzy” (that 
is, without a precise, possessed value). So the passage from dispositional to non-dispositional 
is the passage from the indefiniteness to the definiteness of the relevant properties.  
Of course, in those situations in which the system possesses a precise value of a certain 
observable (property) even before measurement (when its state is an eigenstate of the 
observable), the measurement interaction provided by an experimental context simply 
amplifies the microscopic value to a macroscopic, classical scale. Consequently, we seem to 
have two kinds of contextualism, depending on the way the system has been prepared before 
measurement: if the system has a definite value also before measurement and the latter just 
reveals it, we have an unremarkable kind of contextualism, call it contextualism1. On the 
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contrary, if the value revealed by the measurement interaction causally depends, at least in 
part, on the interaction, we have a stronger, remarkable contextualism2 (this notation is due to 
Clifton and Pagonis 1995, p. 283). 
In this second case, the idea is that the property that is experimentally manifested by the 
microsystem depends on the measurement context; if this is the case, the microsystem 
possesses only a relational form of identity, given that the properties that it manifests depend 
on the whole experimental context. If this sort of holistic view is what QM enforces upon us, 
I propose to redefine the distinction between dispositional (relational) and non-dispositional 
(intrinsically, categorically possessed) properties simply in terms of contextual2 and 
contextual1. Besides enabling us to connect the philosophy of dispositions with the 
philosophy of QM, this stipulation has the advantage of clarifying the unclear distinction 
between dispositional and categorical properties in terms of the well-defined difference 
between states of physical systems (i.e., properties) that are not nd are in an eigenstate of the 
relevant observable.  
Now we can raise the following questions: are there interpretations of QM admitting 
only categorical or intrinsically possessed properties (contextual1) or QM is in need of 
dispositional properties (contextual2) independently of any interpretation? We will see that 
the latter alternative is the case, something that shows that quantum holism, common to 
various interpretations, has something to do with the dispositional nature of the quantum 
world, in the sense of “dispositional” adopted here. Most importantly, we will also see how 
quantum dispositional properties turn out to be irreducible in most interpretations, with the 




4 Dispositions in Bohr’s interpretation of quantum mechanics 
 
Despite the fact that the distinguished physicist Rudolf Peierls could say as recently as 
1986 that «there is only one way in which you can understand quantum mechanics…so when 
you refer to the Copenhagen interpretation of the mechanics what you really mean is quantum 
mechanics» (quoted in Whitaker 1996, p. 160), by now the philosophical (and in good part 
also the scientific) community have stopped supporting this view. Together with this 
interpretation, we will therefore analyze the role of dispositions in other interpretations of the 
formalism, such as the so-called many worlds or many minds interpretations, which we will 
group together, and in other theories, such as Bohm’s (hidden variables) and GRW’s 
(spontaneous collapse theories).  
In presenting Bohr’s view, it is useful to draw a fundamental distinctio between 
ontological and metaphysical ssumptions, the first concerning the mere ind-independent 
existence of quantum systems, and the second concerning what we can say about their 
properties. If we distinguish ontology as the problem of establishing what t ere is from 
metaphysics as the study of the prop rties of what exists, we can classify Bohr as an 
ontological realist but a metaphysical antirealist. Even if we were to follow Redhead in 
thinking that according to Bohr it is simply meaningless to attribute a system whose state is 
not an eigenstate of the relevant observable any property before and independently of 
measurement (Redhead 1987, pp. 49-51), Bohr certainly believed in the reality or mind-
independence of atomic systems (Faye 1991) and defended a strong form of experimental 
contextuality, which is exactly what interests us here. Actually the relationship between the 
principle of complementarity of non-commuting observables, the contextuality and the 
dispositional nature of quantum entities has be n fir t stressed by Bohr, and has not been 
sufficiently noticed by physicists and philosophers writing on Bohr.  
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According to Bohr two properties are complementary if and only if they are mutual 
exclusive and jointly exhaustive (s e Murdoch 1987). We say th t they are mutual exclusive 
because, from the point of view of the classical language, they can be attributed at the same 
time to the same system only via a contradiction. In fact, complementary properties cannot be 
simultaneously revealed by the same experiment, given that any apparatus obeys classical 
physics. On the other hand, if we refer to a quantum system before measurement, the 
complementary properties must be regarded as jointly exhaustive, because any attempt at 
attributing a not-ye  measured system only one of the two properties would yield an 
incomplete description: an electron is neither a particle nor a wave, but has features 
belonging to both concepts.  
In order to be coherent with his complementarity view of QM, Bohr claims that the 
quantum world must be irreducibly dispositional and contextual2, wh re irreducible refers to 
his disbelief in hidden, deterministic variables grounding the fuzzy dispositional state of the 
system before measurement, and contextual2 ref rs to the holistic nature of the micro-system, 
the manifestation of properties dep nding on the kind of experiment one wants to perform.  
Granting that Bohr believes – as he does – in the mind-independence of atoms and 
particles, the dispositional character of the quantum world is therefore an essential 
characteristic of his interpretation of QM. The main reason for this claim is given by the fact, 
often repeated by Bohr especially in his debate with Einstein (Laudisa 1998), that the 
manifestation of the “properties” of quantum systems requires an experiment, and the nature 
of the experiment determines which aspect (which of the complementary properties) of the 
quantum system will be revealed.  
Take the familiar apparatus for a two-slits experiment: do we want to observe the 
interference effects and thereby manifest the typical wave-like natur  of the quantum system 
on the fluorescent screen behind the slits? Then we must renounce to have any information 
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about its particle-like aspect or, to put it more realistically in order to remain faithful to 
Bohr’s ontic realism, we must somehow destroy a ispositional spect of the system, related 
to its particle-like, complementary nature. While antirealist philosophers that follow Bohr 
always stress there in this case there is no way to find out which of the two slits the particles 
has gone through, in more realistic terms we could just say that the disposition to manifest the 
particle-like nature of the system has somehow got lost. 
For our purposes, it is important to note that the quantum system’s wavelike manifested 
property causally depends on its causal interaction with the apparatus, and therefore on what 
we decided to measure. According to Bohr’s interpretation, we cannot assume that there is a 
categorical basis for the manifestation of the wavelike property independently of given 
experimental contexts, since this would be equivalent to assume that the wavelike aspect was 
there all along, at the exclusion of the particle-like, complementary aspect. If we assumed 
such a categorical basis for the wave-like aspect of the system, we could not explain why, if 
we close one of the two slits, the interference effects due to the superposition are lost,6 and on 
the screen we just observe an enlarged image of the slit. By extracting information aboutthe 
position and the spatiotemporal trajectory of the particle-lik  aspect of the quantum system, 
we lose information on its wavelike aspect, and we don’t see any interference; in more 
realistic terms, by closing one slit we prevent the dispositional, wave-like aspect of the 
quantum system from manifesting itself in the experimental context.  
Using the stipulations given above, we are now in the position to understand Bohr’s 
refusal of hidden variable theories (and the consequent belief in the completeness of QM) as 
equivalent to the claim that there is no categorical basis for the dual, “complementary” aspect 
of the quantum systems. Furthermore, to the extent that QM is, as Bohr thought, complete, 
there is no possessed, contextual1 val e (categorical property) before measurement, since it is 
meaningless to attribute one to the quantum system independently of a measurement context. 
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The value revealed after measurement is caused by the interaction of the quantum system 
with the classical apparatus, in the sense that the definiteness of the property is literally 
brought about by it: a formally possible value of a contextual2 observable (Heisenberg’s 
Aristotelian potentiae) gets transformed into an actual value.  
I should insist that according to Bohr the quantum system and the apparatus are 
inseparably inked to each other as phenomena and categories are in Kant’s epistemology: the 
classical language for Bohr is literally the transcendental condition of the possibility of a 
meaningful talk of the quantum world, while Kant’s noumenal world corresponds to the 
quantum world before and independently of the classically describable measurement 
contexts. Of this noumenal world, in Bohr’s reading of it, we can just say that it exists, while 
its properties can be meaningfully referred to only when they manifest themselves via the 
interventions of specific classical measurements apparatuses. This parallel with Kant’s 
philosophy also extends to the fact that if we tried to apply one of the two complementary 
concepts (wave or pa ticle, position or momentum) to the quantum world an Sich, we would 
run into contradictions analogous to those described by Kant (antinomies), caused by the 
application of the categories (i.e., the classical language) to the noumenal world, that is, 
beyond the world of phenomena.  
Clearly, I will not try to defend this reading of Bohr by helping myself with textual 
evidence. All I am claiming is that Bohr’s entity realism, as plausibly defended by Faye, 
requires to be connected with his widely-documented holism on the one hand 
(contextualism2), and his peculiar brand of neo-Kantism on the other. This gives us a belief in 
irreducible dispositions, a language that Bohr himself never used, but to which, I submit, he 
would have not objected. If we were to take this reading of Bohr seriously, we would have to 
admit that the monistic thesis that identifies dispositional and categorical properties would be 
refuted by a physical theory. T  the extent that before measurement the quantum system can 
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be legitimately attributed a probabilistic dispositional property – some instrumentalists, by 
rejecting the mind- ependent existence of the quantum systems, would refute even this 
move – we must admit that the refusal of hidden variables entails the refusal of the existence 
of a categorical (intrinsic or contextual1) property grounding the dispositional (contextual2) 
one. Quantum properties, according to the minimally realistic reading of the Copenhagen 
interpretation I am defending here, are irreducibly dispositional. 
Of course the reductionist about disposition may try to resist the attempt at assigning 
some mind-independent property, fuzzy as it may be, to the quantum system in pre-
measurement states, by claiming that any talk of a quantum world is either void or utterly 
meaningless, since we can only talk about a measured quantum world. In this respect, 
perhaps it is worth recalling that the following, famous quotation, usually attributed to Bohr, 
is really due to Aage Petersen, one of his life-long assistants (Jammer 1974, p. 204): «There 
is no quantum world. There is only an abstract physical description. It is wrong to think that 
the task of physics is to find out how nature is. Physics concerns what we can say about 
nature».  
Last-minute instrumentalists have illegitimately used this quotation to claim that Bohr 
denied any mind-i ependent reality to the quantum world. Giving Bohr his due, however, is 
not to say that his position is immune from difficulties, especially once the quantum world is 
admitted as a mind-independent, noumenal “crutch” on which to hang the experimentally 
detected properties. Bohr in fact never gave us any clear indication as to how we should draw 
the exact boundary between the classical and the quantum world.  
 
5   Dispositions in Bohm’s interpr tation of QM (hidden variables) 
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In this interpretation, QM as is standardly interpreted is regarded as incomplete and is 
supplemented by explicit reference to an unknowable additional “variable”, the changing-in-
time position of particles, a variable th t is perfectly definite at all times but that can be 
revealed to us only by measurements.7 Besides its deterministic features, it is of paramount 
importance to remind the reader that this interpretation regards the physical observables as 
belonging to two categories, the non-contextual ones or contextual1 and the contextual2, and 
that position is the only non-co textual2 observable. This essentially means that position is 
the only variable that can be regarded as being possessed before measurement, in such  way 
that “faithful measurements” just reveal i . 
The contextualism of this interpretation is enhanced by its non-locality, and can be 
explained in the following way. Suppose we have three observable properties, P, P1 and P2, 
such that P1 and P2 cannot be measured simultaneously. The contextuality of property P 
essentially means that if we measure P together with P1 we obtain a result that is different 
from what we obtain by measuring P w th P2, even if the hidden variables (positions) remain 
the same. To put it with a slogan, “positions being equal, different measurements yield 
different results”.8 
Clearly, it is interesting for us to ask in what sense we can attribute to P something 
more than a merely dispositional tendency to show a definite result in a certain measurement 
context.9 In order to be more specific about this question, let P be the direction of the spin of 
a quantum system, measurable with a Stern-Gerlach magnet: is the property of “having spin 
in a given direction” an irreducible disposition, in the same sense in which the contextuality2 
of all observable in Bohr’s interpretation led us to conclude that the relative properties were 
irreducibly dispositional? 
Suppose that we are trying to measure the spin in the z-direction of a particle that is in a 
superposition of being çz-up> and çz-down> in that direction (i.e., suppose that before the 
 17
measurement the particle has spin in the x-d rection and is therefore in a superposition of the 
two previous states). If we invert the polarity of the appara us (from P1 to P2) and leave 
everything else unchanged, we change the measurement result on spin in the z-direction: if 
we had obtained z-up in the previous measurement, we obtain z-d wn in the second. Given 
this result, the property of “having a definite spin in the z-direction” is not categorical, 
intrinsic or faithfully measured: measurements do not in general reveal the pre-existing 
possessed value of spin along the z-direction, for the simple reason that there isn’t any! If by 
switching the magnet and leaving everything else unchanged we change the experimental 
outcome from z-up to z-down, there is no definite property of having a spin in the given 
direction at all. In the terminology introduced before, the property “spin along a given 
direction” is therefore contextual2, for the simple reason that the experimental outcome 
causally depends on the measurement context together, of course, with the “hidden”, non-
contextual2 value of the position of the particle.  
Exactly for this reason, however, in the Bohmian interpretation the dispositional 
properties of “spins along a given direction” – referred to particles that before measurement 
are in a state of superposition with respect to that direction – are reducible to position and the 
context of measurement (Clifton and Pagonis, pp. 285-6). The idea of reducibility is based 
upon the fact that our hypothetical knowledge of the position of the particle plus knowledge 
of the orientation of the magnet would allow us to deduce the result of the outcome with 
certainty. However, for the reasons illustrated above, there is nothing pertaining to “spin in 
the z-direction” that is categorically, intrinsically and definitely possessed by the particle 
before measurement, precisely in virtue of the above stipulation that a property is categorical 
if and only if it has a definite value before measurement and is therefore non-cont xtual2. 
Except for position then, both in Bohm’s and in Heisenberg-Bohr’s interpretations, all 
properties of micro-systems are contextual2 and ther fore dispositional, but in the 
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Copenhagen interpretation, unlike in the Bohmian case, all su h dispositions are of an 
irreducible type. As Clifton and Pagonis correctly remarked, if we assumed that spin-
directions and other properties were irreducibly dispositional, we would lose the benefits of 
the completeness of the theory! (1995, p.288). 
 
6. Dispositions in non-collapse views: the relational interpretation of QM (Rovelli) 
 
Rather than assigning an ontological meaning to the wave function, the relational 
interpretation of QM focuses on the sequence of actual measurement outcomes q1, q2, qN,… 
But such outcomes are to be regarded as the result of cor lations of quantum systems with 
particular “observing physical systems” S, and no absolute meaning is attached to the 
intrinsic properties of an isolated quantum system Q. A quantum system Q can be said to 
possess a certain property q only relative to a system S, and relative to another observing 
system S’, Q and S may be in an indefinite state, i.e., in a superposition.  
Relational quantum mechanics (Rovelli 1996) is therefore a way of reconciling the 
universality of application of the principle of quantum superposition with the fact that the 
observed world is characterized by uniquely determined events. In Rovelli’s and Laudisa’s 
words: «there is no meaning in saying that a certain quantum event has happened or that a 
variable of the system S has taken the value q: rather, there is meaning in saying that the 
event q has happened or the variable has taken the valueq for O, or with respect to O… If I 
observe an electron at a certain position, I cannot conclude that the electron is here: I can 
only conclude that the electron as seen by me is there. Quantum events only happen in 
interactions between systems, and the fact that a quantum event has happened is only true 
with respect to the systems involved in the interaction. The unique account of the state of the 
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world of the classical theory is thus fractured into a multiplicity of accounts, one for each 
possible “observing” physical system.» (Rovelli and Laudisa 2002, sect. 2) 
This interpretation combines features of the Copenhagen view of QM (limitation of 
what we can say about unmeasured systems) with the Everett’s view to be presented later. 
Since in this interpretation we cannot talk about intrinsic properties of physical systems, for 
our purpose it is important to stress that according to Carlo Rovelli’s interpretation the 
quantum world possesses no categorical properties at all. All properties are clearly 
contextual2 and therefore, in our language, irreducibly dispositional; in this interpretation, the 
notion of “correlation” is so central that all properties of the quantum universe are relational: 
there cannot be any categorical, intrinsic property. It is meaningle s to even think of 
categorical properties that ground the disposition to show certain values of position, spin etc.: 
while correlations may be ascribed physical reality, the quantities that are the terms of the 
correlations cannot (Mermin 1998). 
Considering a view of the world in which only (cor)relations have a determinate reality 
and their relata don’t, couldn’t we take the correlated systems S+O to be the basic, categorical 
ontological ingredient, and thereby avoid the dispositionality of all non-relational physical 
properties? This move is unfortunately going to be unsuccessful, since in its turn the joint 
system S+O will possess a determinate property only relatively to another system S’, and may 
well be in a superposed state (and therefore fail to be determinate) relatively to S’’.  
 
6.1 Dispositions in many worlds/many minds interpretation 
 
The main ontological difference between Rovelli’s relational view and Everett’s view 
in its various versions (many worlds, many minds, etc.) derives from the fact that w ile 
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Everett takes the y-function as the ontological basis of QM, Rovelli regards as (relationally) 
real only the outcomes of two-systems correlations. 
As Carlo Rovelli and Federico Laudisa stress, it is one thing to say that a definite value 
or property or event is relative to a system, as in Rovelli’s interpretation; quite another to say 
that definiteness is relative to the sta e of a system, as in Everett’s: «According to the 
relational interpretation, after the first measurement the quantity q has a given value and only 
one for O, while in Everett's terms the quantity q has a value for one state of O and a different 
value for another state of O, and the two are equally real.» (2002, sect. 5).  
In this quotation, Rovelli and Laudisa are clearly ref rring to the many-worlds 
interpretation of Hugh Everett’s interpretation (1957), according to which there is an 
ontological multiplicity of realities, one for each component of the superposed state 
representing the total physical system (see infra). In the many-minds version, on the contrary, 
there is a plurality of mental “viewpoints” or “perspectives” on the same indefinite world, 
which is in a gigantic state of superposition (Albert and Loewer 1988, Squires 1987).10 
Note that such a plurality of perspectives in the relational point of view is absent only 
in appearance, given that in also in Rovelli’s interpretation definite physical quantities can 
actualize only relationally, that is, only once two systems are given. It then follows that for 
any quantum system Q, there are many possible “perspectives” that can be associated with it, 
one for each possible correlation: according to the “perspective” of observer O, event q has 
happened, but according to another perspective associated with O’, q has not happened, and 
both versions must be consider legitimate. The nalogy that Rovelli’s interpretation suggests 
between quantum perspectives on superposed states on the one hand, and special relativistic, 
3+1 “perspectives” on the four dimensional reality (Minkowski spacetime) on the other, 
seems to indicate that – despite the intention of the author – supe position states might be the 
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essential ontological ingredient, and two-systems, quantum correlations mere perspectives on 
an indefinite reality.  
In order to probe the consequences of the many-worlds interpretation for the 
dispositional or categorical nature of its fundamental properties, let us write the quantum state 
of the universe as a superposition of various worlds:11  
   |YUniverse > = åi ci | YWorld-i >, 
 
å|ci |2 = 1 
 
Notice first of all that e ch world behaves like a quasi-classical world of definite properties, 
in which “fuzzy” properties (i.e., superpositions) are absent. Consequently, relative to each 
such world, dispositions are reducible (irreducible) if they are reducible (irreducible) in the 
“ordinary” world of semi-classical physics, which is the setting often presupposed by 
philosophical discussions. From this point of view, the many-worlds interpretation is neutral 
vis à vis the issue of the reducibility of dispositions. 
However, since the whole universe is in a global state of superposition, we could as 
well conclude that, relatively to the quantum state of the universe, wh ch is a perfectly 
definite quantum state from a mathematical viewpoint, the physical properties of the universe 
are really indefinite. Relatively to the quantum state of the universe, we cannot claim that the 
moon has a definite position, given that such the definiteness of such a property is only a 
perspectival matter, depending on, and varying with, different worlds, branches, or minds.12 
Consequently, there seems to be a sense in which the properties of the quantum 
universe (say, having a certain density at a certain time) can be understood as being 
irreducibly dispositional, i.e., as being capable of having different definite “manifestations” 
in different worlds or branches or minds, all of them being actual. That such a dispositional 
reading of Everett-type interpretations is not so implausible can be gathered also by the 
notion of a centered-world put forward by Vaidman (2002, sect. 2), and by him attributed to 
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Saunders (1995): if the world is centered on a human being, only perceived states are 
definite, and non-perceived ones are really superposed. Reality in itself is an entangled mess, 
and has the ungrounded, irreducible disposition to correlate to our brain states in such a way 
that we perceive the world as having definite properties. Never an interpretation of a physical 
theory has put more emphasis on the radical gap between the way th world is (reality) and 
how it illusorily appears to us.13 
 
7 Dispositions in spontaneous collapse theories (GRW) 
 
In the so-called GRW theories (from the acronym of their main inventors, Gian Carlo 
Ghirardi, Alberto Rimini and Tullio Weber), the definite,macroscopic world of our 
experience, threatened to be in a nebulous state by the universal validity of the principle of 
superposition, is obtained via a modification of the linearity of Schrödinger’s equation.14 In 
GRW’s original model (1985), on which we will focus, the wave function of a system is 
multiplied by a localization function, which physically represents a sponta eous localization 
in a “limited” region of space of a previously non-localized quantum system. Apart from 
technicalities, that in this context have no importance, it is essential to note that according to 
GRW the fundamentally stochastic nature of the localization mechanism is not grounded in 
any categorical property of the quantum system: the theory at present stage is purely 
“phenomenological”, in the sense that no “deeper mechanism” is provided to account for the 
causes of the localization. “Spontaneous”, as referred to the localization process, therefore 
simply means “uncaused”.  
In the attempt to unify the dynamics of microscopic and macroscopic systems, GRW 
suppose in other words that all quantum systems have an irreducibly probabilistic disposition 
(a propensity) to localize in a region of space whose dimension is approximately 10-5 cm, 
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with a frequency f given by 10-16 sec-1. The probability that such a process occurs is defined 
as f times a second: this is tantamount to assume that a microscopic system (say, a proton) 
undergoes a localization process, on average, once every 1016 s conds (approximately 
corresponding to once every hundred million years) and this hypothesis explains why isolated 
quantum systems can typically remain for a very long time in non-localized or superposed 
state (i.e., they are spread across a very large region of space).  
However, since a macroscopic system is constituted in average by 1023 atomic 
components, and since the localization of a single particle drives the collapse of all the others, 
it follows that the components of a macroscopic apparatus that are correlated with the particle 
that we want to measur  will undergo a localization every 10-7 seconds. In fact, the average 
number of particles that will collapse spontaneously in a second is given by 10-16 x 1023 = 
107, which means the macroscopic apparatus remains in a state of indefinite position (i.e., i  a 
superposition of two position states) for no more that 10-7 seconds: as Bell put it, 
Schrödinger’s cat remains neither dead nor alive for no more than a split second (1987, p. 
44). 
For our purposes, it is essential to stress once again that the new unc used t nde cy to 
“swerve” attributed to the atoms by GRW (in Lucretius’ De Rer m Natura we read of a 
“clinamen” accidentally deviating the vertical fall of the Democritean atoms)15 is an 
irreducibly dispositional property, that becomes actual or is manifested in ways that could 
call for – were the new theory prove to be successful in overcoming its present difficulties 
with a relativistic extension – the introduction of new constants of nature. Furthermore, 
despite the fact that the irreducibly stochastic propensity to localize is not grounded in any 
categorical properties of the quantum system, it is nevertheless strongly explanatory of the 
definiteness of the macroscopic world of our experience. We should therefore change our 
prejudices concerning ungrounded dispositional properties as being always explanatorily 
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empty: the explanatory power of GRW is given by the u ifica ion that the modified equation 
accomplishes between the dynamical evolution of quantum systems and the classical 
evolution of macroscopic systems.16 
 
8 QM and the problem of the reducibility of dispositional to categorical properties 
 
 
Summarizing, we have seen that in all of the most important interpretations of QM  
(i) dispositional properties – whether probabilistic or deterministic – have a 
crucial role; 
(ii) the only interpretation in which we seem to have reductionism about 
dispositional, contextual2 properties is Bohm’s.  
Before trying to draw our conclusion about these two claims, it is important to recall 
their relevance for our purpose: if in the most-debated interpretations of QM there are no 
categorical properties to which one could reduce the dispositional properties, the 
philosophical thesis that tries to reduce the latter to the former is in serious difficulties, 
because it is in conflict with the most fundamental theory of matter of our day.  
In order to justify the last statement, the three following comments to (i) are 
appropriate. First: the fact that even the Copenhagen interpretation of QM, that is closest to 
instrumentalism – and, therefore, closest to a philosophical position that resists from drawing 
ontological essons from physical theories – is forced to invoke a strong form of 
contextualism2, is a strong point in favor of the claim that quantum properties are essentially 
dispositional.  
Second: the fact that, in interpretations as ontologically and methodologically different 
as the Copenhagen and the hidden variables interpretation, the contextualism2 of 
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“phenomena” (i.e., their dispositionality) is regarded as fundamental seems to te ch us 
something very deep about the holistic ontology of QM, independently of our philosophical 
tastes. For Bohr as well as for Bohm, such contextualism refers to the ins parability of 
classical apparatuses and the behavior and properties revealed by QM-systems, in the same 
sense in which, in the special theory of relativity, one cannot separate space from time except 
by making a conventional choice of an inertial frame. Despite the big difference between 
Bohr and Bohm, which lies of course in the latter’s postulation of non-contextual, always 
defined observables (positions of particles), we should be aware as well of the similarities, 
which have been stressed independently also by Bell. 
Third, to the extent that it is not absurd to attribute to an entity realists like Bohr the 
view that microsystems have dispositional, probabilistic tendencies to display well-defined 
outcomes in given experimental contexts – whose function is to somehow “extract” “latent 
aspects” from a real (i.e., mind-independent) entity – Bohr’s and Heisenberg’s positions 
appear to be very similar. Unfortunately, claiming that a micro-system M has a “real 
disposition” to show a certain behavior in a measurement context has little planatory 
power, as it just amounts to saying that if we measure the “fuzzy entity” M we get a definite 
outcome. Bohr’s obsession with the language of classical physics as the transcendental 
condition of possibility to talk about a quantum system may have the unfortuna e 
consequence of preventing us from lea ning more about the nature of quantum dispositions. 
In a word, Bohr’s and Heisenberg potentialities are as ungrounded as GRW’s “hits”, but 
while the latter’s dispositions to localize play an extremely important explanatory function, 
the former types of dispositions don’t. So, contrary to the common cliché according to which 
ungrounded dispositions carry as much explanatory power as the famous virtut s dormitivae 
in Moliere’s comedy, it is not the ungroundedness of dispositions that matters, but the 
particular pragmatic context of the explanation. 
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Coming now to (ii), and wanting to assess at the same time Clifton and Pagonis’s claim 
that Bohmian dispositions are unremarkable despite their contextuality2, we must avoid 
possible sources of misunderstandings. We have seen that in Bohm’s theory there cannot be 
any talk of a possessed value of a contextual2 property before measurement and that, in this 
sense, there cannot be any pre-existing, real property of “having a spin in a certain direction” 
to be revealed by measurements. Having “no definite spin in a given direction” seems to 
imply “having no spin at all in that direction”, in the same sense in which “having no definite 
color” implies “having no color at all”.  
But then a remarkable difference between a quantum and a classical disposition would 
seem to emerge: on the one hand, it is meaningless to ask what is the possessed value of the 
spin of the particle independently of a specific measurement context. On the other, at least 
within a realist view of “classical”, macroscopic dispositions, i  is clearly not meaningless to 
refer to the fragility of a glassindependently of, and before of, a “breaking context”. Isn’t 
this a remarkable difference between macroscopic dispositions and quantum dispositions in 
Bohmian mechanics? By claiming that Bohmian dispositions are “nothing to write home 
about”, have Clifton and Pagonis (1995) overlooked something? This criticism of Clifton and 
Pagonis, however, is based on a simple misunderstanding. 
It is true that in any mini al realism about dispositions, with which I would agree, the 
glass possesses the fragility independently of the breaking context, and the disposition 
“fragility” can be attributed to a glass even if it will never break. Let us agree that there is a 
real property of “being fragile, or being disposed to break in such and such a context”, even 
before and independently of its manifestation; in monistic views, such a property exists 
precisely because it is dentical with the micro-structural categorical property of the glass, 
plus context. Why isn’t this different from Bohmian spins, given that there is no way for us to 
refer to a non-contextually2 possessed value of spin before the measurement context?  
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What we should say to defend the perfect analogy between a Bohmian “spin in a given 
direction” and classical dispositions like fragility is that the latter’s “propensity to break in a 
certain context” corresponds to “the propensity to show a definite spin in a certain 
measurement context”, which is clearly possessed by Bohmian particles also before 
measurement, and independently of it. In the Bohmian case, the correct analogy with the 
classical disposition “fragility” is not given by “having a definite spin” but by “the 
disposition to have a definite spin”. It follows that the manifestation of the two dispositions 
is, respectively, the breaking event in one case and the acquisition of a definite spin in the 
other. Accordingly, and even from the viewpoint of a realist position about dispositions, 
Clifton and Pagonis are correct in holding that the contextualism of values in Bohm’s theory 
is not remarkably different from the dispositionality of ordinary classical properties. 
 Coming now to the reducibility thesis in the Bohmian theory, we should ask whether 
the property “being disposed to have a certain definite value of spin” is identical to the 
categorical basis, given by the non-contextual position of the particle whose spin is to be 
measured, plus a specific measurement context (a certain orientation of a Stern-Gerlach 
apparatus).  
Given the deterministic nature of the theory, however, it seems at first appropriate to 
claim that the measurement context, together with the non-contextual observable nd the 
propensity to manifest a certain spin in a given direction, caus the particle to have such and 
such a spin. This move seems to make room for a dualistic theory of a Placean kind, to the 
extent that the latter is committed to the view that the categorical base causes (and is not 
identical with) the disposition, and the latter in its turn, together with the context, causes the 
manifestation. According to Place, the fragility is caused and explained by the molecular 
structure of the glass, and it is the fragility that causes and explains the breaking of the glass 
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by a stone. If this causal analysis were correct, the reducibility which Clifton and Pagonis 
defend would not follow. 
However, Place’s account of dispositional properties seems to multiply causes without 
necessity. The stone is certainly a cause of the breaking, together with the molecular structure 
of the window glass: if the structure of the window had been different, the stone would have 
not broken it. But claiming that fragility, referred to the glass as macroscopic entity, is an 
additional cause of the breaking introduces an unnecessary link in the narrative: as we have 
seen in the previous chapter, the predicate “fragile” has a predictive function that refers to 
certain contexts, but the cause of the breaking and its true explanation lies in the microscopic 
structure of the glass. Fragility by itself can provide only very fragile explanations. 
The case seems perfectly analogous for quantum, bohmian dispositions. The quantum 
dispositional property “propensity to show a certain spin” should be regarded as identical 
with a complex state of affair, constituted by the possessed position and other purely 
contextual1 properties of the particle. Note that we cannot claim that the categorical property 
(position) is a sufficient cause for the manifestation of the disposition in the same sense in 
which the microstructure of glass is not sufficient for the breaking event  
 
  9 Conclusions 
 
Since only bohmian dispositions are reducible to context and non-contextual variables, 
the possibility of considering dispositions as reducible seem to depend on the prospect of 
success for the Bohmian interpretation of QM. The fact that the non-loc l contextuality of the 
fundamental physical observables is so widespread a feature of various interpretation of QM 
confirms that the quantum world cannot be conceived of as inhabited by entities whose 
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identity is given by intrinsically possessed properties. The relational aspect of such entities is 
much more important to understand what these entities really are. 
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1 I thank Federico Laudisa for having read a previous version of this manuscript and the audience in Paris for 
valuable suggestions and criticisms. 
2 The first position he discusses is the Copenhagen interpretation, while the third is associated with a “property 
realism” of Bohm’s type. For these interpretations, s e below. 
3 The interested reader could look at Dorato (1995). 
4 The case of the direction of spin, rather than its magnitude, will be discussed below.
5 Mumford’s proposal to distinguish dispositional from non-dispositional properties in terms of functinal roles 
and specification of that role respectively is not too dissimilar from the approach followed here: «to give a 
disposition ascription is to say something about what a thing can do but to say nothing about how it does what it 
does…With a categorical property ascription, nothing is entailed, purely conceptually, about what causal or 
functional role such a shape, state, structure, or property will play in its interactions with other things. Hence it 
is not possible to derive anything about the causal role of  property, analytically, from the meaning of a 
categorical property ascription…(1998, pp. 76-77). 
6 Here the superposition in question corresponds to the property of having gone through the first and the second 
slit. In general, a superposition of states corresponds to the sum of two or more states, and in our context is 
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roughly synonymous with a formally well-defined state that at a macroscopic level would refer to an indefinite 
property.  
7 The theory is described by two equations, the familiar Sch ödinger’s equation and a guide equation relating the 
velocity of the k-th particle to the gradient of the y- unction with respect to the k-coordinate of the particle. 
8 For a readable account of Bohmian mechanics, see Goldstein (2001). 
9 Furthermore, the assumption that the observable A h s a definite, possessed value that – in being independent 
of the measurement context – is non-contextual2, would lead to a contradiction with a well-kno n “no-go 
theorem”, prohibiting a non-contextual2, simultaneous asignment of a definite value to all the observables of a 
system (Kochen and Specker 1967). 
10 This second reading seems to be closer to the original view proposed by Everett (1957). 
11 Here I follow Lev Vaidman’s notation (2002) 
12 Replace “worlds” with “minds in a single individual” and you get the many-minds view. 
13 For the problem of the empirical coherence of Everett’s type views of QM, see Barrett (1999). 
14 A recent, readable survey of collapse theories and relative references is given in Ghirardi (2002) 
15 This historical parallel is due to Van Fraassen (see Ghirardi 1997, pp. 379-381) 
16 Friedman (1974) and Kitcher (1976) have both proposed a theory of explanation according to which to 
explain means to unify. 
